En los últimos 10 años, la Oficina del Asesor en Cumplimiento (CAO) ha recibido 231 reclamaciones relacionadas con proyectos de la Corporación Financiera Internacional (CFI) y del Organismo Multilateral de Garantía de Inversiones (OMGI), las dos ramas del Grupo del Banco Mundial dedicadas al sector privado. De estas 231 reclamaciones, algo menos de la mitad han sido declaradas admisibles (115) y se han sometido a la resolución de conflictos o a la revisión del cumplimiento, los dos mecanismos disponibles para la tramitación de las reclamaciones. Su proceso de resolución de disputas ha tenido un éxito relativo, ya que alrededor del 75% de los casos se han resuelto parcial o totalmente. Su función de cumplimiento, por otra parte, ha tenido menos éxito, en particular en lo que respecta a su capacidad para proporcionar reparación a las personas afectadas por los proyectos que se han visto afectadas por el incumplimiento de la CFI o el OMGI. Sólo en el 13 por ciento de los casos se consideró que las medidas correctivas eran adecuadas para que el proyecto cumpliera con la normativa, mientras que en el 87 por ciento de los casos se consideró que las medidas eran parcialmente satisfactorias o insatisfactorias.

A raíz de estos resultados, se ha llevado a cabo una revisión externa de la CAO, en particular de su función de cumplimiento, y de la responsabilidad ambiental y social (A&S) de la CFI y el OMGI. Esta es la cuarta revisión en la historia de la CAO, con las anteriores realizadas en 2003, 2006 y 2010. Este tipo de revisiones es una de las formas integrales en que todos los Mecanismos Independientes de Rendición de Cuentas (MRI), de los cuales la CAO es sólo uno, mejoran, se adaptan y crecen a medida que se desarrollan sus instituciones y mejores prácticas. También son una forma esencial en la que los MRI, como instituciones independientes, incorporan la retroalimentación externa.

Esta revisión más reciente se inició en junio de 2019 a petición de las Juntas de la CFI y el OMGI, para abordar algunas de las preocupaciones planteadas anteriormente. Estas se intensificaron aún más por lo que se describe como "crecientes riesgos de litigio a los que se enfrenta la CFI", en alusión al reciente y ampliamente publicitado caso en su contra(Jam contra la CFI).

La revisión fue llevada a cabo por un grupo de seis expertos independientes y externos a quienes se les encomendó la tarea de formular recomendaciones sobre el acuerdo de gobernanza, el papel y la eficacia de la CAO; el impacto que los actuales procesos de la CAO tienen sobre las partes interesadas; la capacidad de respuesta de la CFI y el OMGI a las preocupaciones relativas a los impactos adversos; la asimilación del aprendizaje del trabajo de la CAO a nivel de las políticas de la CFI y el OMGI; y la necesidad de desarrollar mecanismos de reclamación dentro de la administración de la CFI y el OMGI.

Recomendaciones de la Evaluación Externa
Tras su proceso de revisión de 10 meses, se elaboró el siguiente conjunto de recomendaciones dirigidas tanto a la IFC/MIGA como a la CAO.

Recomendaciones para la IFC/MIGA:

• tomar la iniciativa para garantizar y promover la sostenibilidad en el sector privado
• clarificar la responsabilidad A&S de los intermediarios financieros y garantizar su rendimiento A&S
• reforzar las capacidades, los sistemas y la mentalidad de las organizaciones para responder a las preocupaciones y quejas de las personas afectadas
• crear una cultura de respuesta más activa y una mayor disposición a comprometerse con los clientes y denunciantes
• reconocer que una CAO eficaz es un componente integral de la responsabilidad A&S de la CFI/MIGA
• establecer un marco de la CFI y el OMGI para la adopción de medidas correctoras en los casos en que el incumplimiento contribuya al perjuicio

Recomendaciones para la CAO:

• revisar la estructura de informes para que la CAO dependa del Directorio (actualmente la CAO depende del Presidente del Grupo del Banco Mundial)  
• acortar los plazos de tramitación de las reclamaciones (la revisión del cumplimiento tarda una media de más de 3 años)
• intensificar los esfuerzos para buscar una solución rápida a las reclamaciones
• mejorar las medidas para proteger al cliente y dar a la CFI/MIGA una voz formal en las primeras etapas del proceso de cumplimiento
• crear una nueva política aprobada por el consejo y revisar las directrices operativasde la CAO

While this process and the findings it produced were directed at IFC/MIGA and the CAO, there is huge value in other international financial institutions (IFIs) and IAMs examining these findings and their broader relevance to the field of accountability in development finance. This includes for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Independent Redress Mechanism (IRM), particularly due to the similarities in the funding models, including the use of financial intermediaries, and E&S policies and standards of the GCF and IFC.

Financial Intermediation
One of the key findings regarding the funding structure, was the uncertainty created by financial intermediaries, entities that act as middlemen to on-lend or invest in sub-projects. The review found that there is currently insufficient clarity on how its E&S policies apply to sub-projects and significant gaps in the IFC’s ability to ensure that its financial intermediary clients are adequately assessing E&S risks and ensuring the application of the IFC’s Performance Standards. In addition, the complexity associated with financial intermediaries also creates challenges for the CAO’s functioning, both for affected stakeholders to access the CAO as well as for determining whether incoming complaints are eligible.

Therefore, the review recommended that the IFC further clarify how it will assure itself of the E&S performance of its financial intermediaries, strengthen its due diligence and supervision of financial intermediary clients and enhance the transparency of IFC-funded portfolios and sub-projects. These recommendations are very relevant to the GCF, which also channels a substantial proportion of its funding through financial intermediaries. In addition to the complexity of channeling its project finance through financial intermediaries, the GCF’s portfolio also includes ‘programmes’, which are funded activities with overarching goals and themes, which are made up of sub-projects usually spanning across several countries. These sub-projects are not, as yet, disclosed on the GCF website and are not required to be individually approved by the GCF Board, but are rather identified subsequently according to a broad set of eligibility criteria. These layers in the financing structure of the GCF are worth examining in the light of the issues faced by the IFC. 

Remediation of Harm
One of the most significant recommendations was the need for improved systems for providing remedy to affected people. This remains one of the weakest points across the board for IAMs where even with findings of non-compliance, affected people are often left with no or inadequate remedy. The review recommended the establishment of a ‘remedial action framework’, a clearly defined structure and process for how remedy should be provided if required. Firstly, it recommended that there should be a requirement for all IFC clients to create a means of funding remedy should it be required. These could be in the form of insurance, performance bonds, or contingency reserves which can be accessed or triggered where needed. And secondly, it recommended that the Board should agree to the principle that where IFC/MIGA itself has contributed to harm, it should be required to also contribute to remedy, including in the form of financial compensation where needed. This could be made possible through the establishment of a remedy fund to meet these commitments.

Relations between CAO and IFC Management
Lastly, the review emphasized the importance of ensuring good relations between the management of IFC/MIGA and its accountability mechanism, the CAO. The review noted that while some level of tension is likely to occur when the CAO investigates compliance of the IFC/MIGA, they found that their disagreements have led to “polarized attitudes and unconstructive interactions”. These disagreements have in some cases impeded the flow of information, delayed processes, undermined potential corrective actions, and limited the utility of some compliance reviews to act as an opportunity to learn from difficult cases. The review, therefore, proposed that current CAO processes (including IFC/MIGA roles and responses) be adjusted to promote a more collaborative relationship. This is a finding that all IFIs and respective IAMs should take note of. Promoting a collaborative relationship which enhances the outcomes of IAM processes, while still maintaining the IAMs independence and objectivity, will facilitate greater access to remedy for affected people.

IRM’s Learning and Dialogue Forum
In order to share these lessons both within the GCF and IRM, the IRM hosted an inreach event on 13 October 2020 where Professor Arntraud Hartmann, one of the external reviewers, presented these findings to the GCF Secretariat and independent unit staff. This was followed by a brief commentary by the Head of the IRM, Dr Lalanath de Silva, on the similarities and differences between the two institutions, and what we as the GCF and IRM may learn from these findings. The virtual event was attended by approximately 40 staff, many of whom contributed to the debate with interesting questions and insights.

This review has been extremely significant for the accountability world in its scope and depth. Here at the IRM we hope that these findings will have positive consequences across IAMs and IFIs, including within our own institution. The IFC and CAO are forerunners in the development finance accountability space, with a wealth of data and experience. It is essential that we foster dialogue and learning within and between institutions, to accelerate our growth and effectiveness.
 
Article prepared by Katrina Lehmann-Grube and Christine Reddell